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The accidental introduction of nonnative nuisance(“invasive”) species is a critical environmental issue.
Estimates of the economic damages arising from these in-
troductions are needed to formulate effective policy in this
area. Damage estimates can help policymakers and man-
agers to understand the gravity of the problem and develop
appropriate management responses. To be useful, such esti-
mates must rely on both a sound ecological understanding and
the proper application of economic methods.
To date, policy responses to the introduction and spread of
invasive species have been based on very crude estimates of
economic damages. For example, in drafting the Ballast 
Water Management Act of 2005 (S. 363), the US Senate found
that annual estimates of the costs to the US economy from
aquatic nuisance species alone range from millions to billions
of dollars. This finding can be traced back to a compilation
by Pimentel and coauthors (2000, 2005) of the annual eco-
nomic effects of many of the invasive species that have become
established in the United States. There are many reasons to
be concerned about the use of these estimates for policy-
making, however.
The European green crab
To illustrate our point, we focus on one particular species, the
European green (or shore) crab (Carcinus maenas). In the
United States, the green crab has gained a reputation, perhaps
undeservedly, as a ravenous predator that can lay waste to shell-
fish stocks (Hedgpeth 1993). The green crab is native to the
Atlantic coast of Europe, and it is thought to have been in-
troduced along the US Atlantic coast in the early 19th century.
By the mid-20th century, the crab had spread northward
from Cape Cod along the coasts of Maine and Nova Scotia.
By 1990, it had appeared in San Francisco Bay, and thereafter
it began to expand its range into estuarine environments
northward along the West Coast.
The estimate by Pimentel and colleagues (2000, 2005) of
the annual economic costs of the green crab invasion into New
England is $44 million. Pimentel and colleagues cite Lafferty
and Kuris (1996) as the source for their estimate.
To support their argument for the potential impacts of the
green crab on the West Coast, Lafferty and Kuris examine sev-
eral early studies from the 1950s (Glude 1955, MacPhail et al.
1955, Moulton and Gustafson 1956) and two later studies
(Ropes 1968, Elner 1981) of the likely adverse effects of the
green crab in New England coastal waters. They state that these
studies find the green crab is “associated with” the demise of
the softshell clam fishery in northern New England and Nova
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Scotia. Lafferty and Kuris argue that the possibility exists for
economic losses of all or part of the landings of the Dunge-
ness crab, rock crab, mussel, oyster, and bait fisheries in
northern and southern California and in Washington State’s
Puget Sound.
In fact, Lafferty and Kuris estimate the potential, not the
actual, impacts of the green crab; and their estimates are for
California and Washington State, not for New England (see
also Carlton 2001). The number that Pimentel and colleagues
(2000, 2005) cite as reflecting the economic impact of the green
crab in New England is actually Lafferty and Kuris’s estimate
of the crab’s potential impact only in Puget Sound.
Uncertain ecological impacts
The predictions Lafferty and Kuris (1996) made about eco-
logical effects may rest on loose footing. For example, in
northern California, where green crabs had been established
by the time of their paper’s publication, Lafferty and Kuris 
attributed about 90 percent of the crabs’ potential economic
impact to the complete loss of harvests in the Dungeness
crab fishery. A reasonable interpretation of the data on Dun-
geness crab landings, however, suggests that the green crab has
not yet had any discernible effect on this fishery (figure 1a;
CDFG 2005).
Pimentel and colleagues (2000, 2005) and Lafferty and
Kuris (1996) base their arguments for the green crab’s eco-
nomic impacts on assumed losses in the New England soft-
shell clam (Mya arenaria) fishery, which is concentrated in
Maine. However, neither set of authors appears to have ex-
amined the status of this fishery in the period since the 1950s,
when the first studies suggested a link between the green
crab and the possible demise of the softshell clam. Data on
landings of softshell clams in Maine (figure 1b) suggest that
the demise of the state’s softshell clam fisheries may have
been overstated (figure 1b; MDMR 2005).What is clear is that
the explanation for changes in softshell clam yields, on which
the argument for impacts from the green crab relies, may be
more complicated than a simple story about one predator and
one prey (Welch 1968, Gillis et al. 2000, Yamada 2001).
Misapplications of economic methods
The estimate made by Lafferty and Kuris (1996) of the 
potential economic impact of the green crab on West Coast
shellfisheries is a misapplication of economic methods in
several respects. A correct measure of damages associated
with aquatic nuisance species should be based on a compar-
ison of invasion scenarios before and after an invasion.
Lafferty and Kuris take the ex-vessel value of landings in 
selected West Coast fisheries during 1990 and 1991 as the be-
ginning datum. They develop two economic impact metrics
from this value: lost “net revenues” and lost “secondary and
tertiary values.” They assume afterward that the value of ex-
vessel revenues is completely lost in each of the fisheries.
Why that assumption seems unrealistic has already been cov-
ered. Here the discussion turns to the implications of their
choices of metrics.
The estimate of the potential economic impact of the
green crab on West Coast shellfisheries is inconsistent with eco-
nomic theory in at least two ways. First, Lafferty and Kuris at-
tempt to estimate the “net” revenues from West Coast
shellfisheries. A calculation of the net revenues lost to a fish-
ery would be an appropriate, albeit possibly incomplete,
measure of the costs to the economy from predation by the
green crab. The total loss to the economy should be the sum
of declines in both consumer and producer surpluses. If
there are close substitutes for the species in question, it is not
unreasonable to assume that consumer surplus changes might
be small. The institutional measures used to manage the rel-
evant fisheries, however, may dictate whether changes in pro-
ducer surpluses (or net revenues) are small or large (Freeman
1991). If the fishery is not managed rationally (i.e., with taxes
or transferable quotas), it would be unrealistic to expect net
revenues to be significant, except possibly during an unusu-
ally productive fishing season.
Unfortunately, Lafferty and Kuris’s estimate of lost net
revenues is unrealistic. The authors adjust gross revenues for
the relevant fisheries down by 20 percent to account for the
costs of fishing, yielding an estimate of net revenues that is 80
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Figure 1. Fifty-four years of (a) Dungeness crab landings
in northern California, including the Crescent City–
Eureka–Fort Bragg, Bodega Bay–San Francisco, and
Monterey Bay–Morro Bay areas (CDFG 2005), and 




percent of gross revenues. They do not explain their justifi-
cation for selecting the scale of this adjustment. Even though
the Dungeness crab fishery is a limited-access fishery, it would
be unusual for any industry to operate with an 80 percent
profit margin.
The management measures applied in the California Dun-
geness crab fishery (limited access, closed season, gear re-
strictions, and size and sex restrictions) suggest that fishing
costs cut substantially into resource rents. Dewees and col-
leagues (2004) explain that the fishery has been “fully and in-
tensely” exploited for at least 40 years. Although there is a
moratorium on entry in this fishery, regulations do not limit
fishing effort because fishery participants are not restricted
in their application of time, number of traps, vessel size, or
horsepower.As a consequence, there is a race for fish, and most
landings occur during only the first six weeks of a seven-month
season. Although we are unaware of any published analysis
of rents for this fishery, an estimate of the scale of fishery rents,
based on the results of the 2002 survey of capitalized crab per-
mit values conducted by Dewees and colleagues (2004), sug-
gests that they are approximately only 3 percent of gross
revenues (about $564,413 on ex-vessel landings of $17.72
million during the 2000–2001 season, using a discount rate
of 5 percent). Consequently, the use of net revenues as cal-
culated by Lafferty and Kuris probably overstates by an order
of magnitude the loss to the fishery, even if reductions in land-
ings had been both observed and linked conclusively to green
crab predation of Dungeness crab juveniles.
Second, Lafferty and Kuris apply a multiplier of 1.5 to net
revenues in order to capture the direct, indirect, and induced
effects on the economy of the loss of revenues from these fish-
eries (what the authors refer to as secondary and tertiary
values). The authors neither justify their selection of a mul-
tiplier of 1.5 nor specify the type of multiplier (cf. Leung and
Pooley 2002). Although the authors do not identify the ori-
gin of their multiplier, it seems likely that they chose it from
the results of a calibrated regional economic input–output
model. Even in that case, however, the resulting estimate
would not be a valid measure of economic loss in a fishery.
The reason is that this particular economic impact measure
includes the costs of business activities. If the landings fall to
zero and these activities are discontinued, the costs of fishing
for these species and the costs in linked industries would
not be incurred. Further, the resources used for fishing and
the industries to which it is linked would soon be redistrib-
uted to their next best productive uses in the economy. Con-
sequently, these impact estimates may also overstate actual
losses to the economy.
An economic approach
An economic approach consists of estimating in monetary
terms the actual or potential economic damages resulting from
an invasion and the costs associated with alternative man-
agement responses, including the possibilities of preventing
the invasion, controlling its spread, eradicating the invader,
or doing nothing at all. Damages are then compared with re-
sponse costs in order to suggest an appropriate policy.An eco-
nomically optimal policy is one that minimizes the com-
bined sum of damages and control costs.
A correct measure of invasive species damage to a fishery
must be based on a comparison of economic value before and
after an invasion. A description of economic value after an in-
vasion may be hypothetical, but it must be realistic and based
on sound ecological understanding. Without this under-
standing, there is a significant risk that management actions
will be wasteful or feckless. Damages to a commercial fishery
should include lost consumer and producer surpluses; in
many situations, net revenues may be an appropriate measure
of damages. Estimates of changes to economic surpluses can
be derived from a model of supply and demand in the rele-
vant market; often such models require an understanding of
the biological dynamics and ecological interactions relating
to the exploited stocks (Conrad and Clark 1987).
There also may be changes in the flow of nonmarket eco-
logical services when an ecosystem is modified by an invasion.
These damages may lead to lost recreational opportunities and
so-called passive-use damages, which involve the possibility
of economic losses in the absence of direct physical uses of an
ecosystem (Freeman 1995). Nonmarket damages often are dif-
ficult to quantify because of the complex interactions among
species in an ecosystem, the uncertain outcomes of these 
interactions, the lack of information about the public’s pref-
erences across alternative ecological states, and the method-
ological difficulties in measuring those preferences. Only a 
few studies have begun to provide estimates of nonmarket
damages from invasive species (Lupi et al. 2003, Nunes and
van den Bergh 2004).
Where invasive species have been introduced by humans,
whether intentionally or not, the resource economics litera-
ture treats invasive species properly as a form of biological pol-
lution (Horan et al. 2002). Like other forms of pollution,
the unintentional introduction of nuisance species is a by-
product of normal economic activities, such as shipping,
aquaculture, or marine recreation. A standard theoretical re-
sult is that nuisance species should be controlled until the last
dollar invested in control yields an equivalent amount in
damage reduction. Because the interactions between eco-
nomic and ecological systems often are complex (Settle et al.
2002), most economic studies focus appropriately on the ef-
fects occurring only in the relevant markets, thereby ignor-
ing the consequences for the rest of the economy. One
supporting assumption in such “partial equilibrium” studies
is that the effects on the broader economy are negligible.
Options for controlling invasive species may involve pre-
vention, culling, or eradication. Although public policy ap-
pears to favor the prevention of introductions (e.g., through
ballast water regulations), prevention is not necessarily eco-
nomically efficient in all circumstances. Whether prevention
is efficient may depend on the expected economic damages
relative to prevention costs, the effectiveness of preventive ac-
tions, and the discount rate (Jensen 2002). Once an invasion
has occurred, control costs may be a function of the size of
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the invading population. As in the case of a fishery, the mar-
ginal costs of control typically decline with increased num-
bers. Consequently, for some invasions, it may be economically
efficient to allow the population of an invader to grow until
the marginal culling costs have been lowered sufficiently (Ol-
son and Roy 2003). Finally, an economically optimal policy
should lead to a reduction in the rate of invasion or in the
spread of a particular species, but it does not necessarily in-
volve the eradication of an invader (Olson and Roy 2002,
Skonhoft and Schulz 2003). Eradication policies often in-
volve control costs that mount at an increasing rate, so that
the benefits (in terms of reduced losses) become small in re-
lation to control costs.
An ideal model of aquatic nuisance species management
also comprises dynamic and multispecies aspects, because 
biological invasions occur over time and involve multifaceted
ecological interactions. For example, Barbier (2001) develops
a predator–prey model that captures interspecific competi-
tion and dispersion. Barbier’s model shows that the extent to
which the profits from commercial fishing are reduced by the
introduction and spread of an invasive species depends crit-
ically on the type of ecological interaction that exists. This re-
sult can be generalized to the other dimensions of an ecological
system, implying that the scale and time distribution of eco-
nomic damages may be sensitive to changes in intrinsic
growth rates, carrying capacities, or other relevant biological
parameters.
Knowler and colleagues (2002) apply these concepts to
the interactions between nutrient enrichment, an invasive
species, and fisheries in the Black Sea. The authors assume that
recruitment to stocks of Black Sea anchovies is related posi-
tively to nutrient levels. When an exotic comb jelly is intro-
duced, however, nutrient enrichment leads to a “regime shift”
in which recruitment to anchovy stocks is diminished and the
comb jelly flourishes. The authors show how to estimate the
scale of economic benefits associated with controls on nutrient
releases that could prevent the regime shift.
Barbier (2001) has suggested that future modeling efforts
should consider more complex ecological interactions (e.g.,
between invading and resident species), modifications to
natural habitat, and nonmarket damages. Settle and Shogren
(2002), for example, develop a model in which visitors to 
Yellowstone National Park benefit from harvests of either a
native fish (cutthroat trout) or an invasive fish (lake trout) and
from sightings of either birds of prey or grizzly bears. Species
flows in the model depend on ecological interactions (humans,
birds of prey, grizzlies, and lake trout are all predators of cut-
throat trout). Park managers must choose to divide a limited
budget between culling lake trout and improving access roads
in order to maximize economic benefits to park visitors.
From a pragmatic perspective, the analytical complexity of
theoretical models—and the length of time needed to put
them into practice—often represents a severe constraint to im-
plementing management responses in real time. Conse-
quently, there is a need to simplify modeling approaches to
avoid analytical paralysis. Leung and colleagues (2005) develop
a framework for rapid assessments to guide investments in pre-
vention or control. In their framework, ecological complex-
ity is simplified to a relatively small number of easily estimated
parameters.
Biological invasions frequently are unexpected, novel events
(Perrings et al. 2002). They may lead to catastrophic and ir-
reversible consequences, and they may involve unknown
probabilities. Management decisions must be made on the 
basis of incomplete information about the set of possible
invaders, the likelihood of their being introduced and spread-
ing, and the potential economic damages when invasions
occur. A general strategy for characterizing the risks associ-
ated with invasions requires an understanding of the temporal,
spatial, and taxonomic completeness of ecological data and
estimates of the potential distribution, abundance, and spread-
ing rates of the invaders (Stohlgren and Schnase 2006).
Where probabilities about biological invasions are thought
to be small but cannot be estimated easily (i.e., substantial un-
certainty exists), the public might weigh outcomes involving
extensive losses more heavily than if the risks were better
known. In such instances, there is a strong tendency for the
expected benefits of control to be highly valued (Horan et al.
2002). In other words, such conditions could lead to unnec-
essarily excessive levels of control. Studies that “assume the
worst”are likely to contribute to this tendency, resulting in the
implementation of economically wasteful policies. This con-
clusion reinforces the need for scientific research that helps
to resolve the uncertainty.
Broader implications
The confusion over estimates of the economic impacts of the
green crab has broader implications for policy development.
Heretofore, estimates of the economic losses arising from
invasive species have been far too casual. Unfounded calcu-
lations of economic damages lacking a solid demonstration
of ecological effects are misleading and wasteful. Where hy-
potheses of adverse ecological effects cannot be rejected, a crit-
ical next step is the proper application of economic theory and
methods to develop reliable estimates of economic losses. Such
estimates can provide a foundation for sound public policy.
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